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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4741 
___________ 
 
WILFREDO GONZALEZ-LORA, 
     Appellant 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;  
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-00069) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 6, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Wilfredo Gonzalez-Lora appeals the District Court’s orders (1) 
dismissing his “petition for review [of] a naturalization proceeding and request for a nunc 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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pro tunc naturalization,” and (2) denying his motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.   
 Gonzalez-Lora entered the United States from the Dominican Republic in 1984 as 
a lawful permanent resident.  In 1992, he filed an N-400 application to become a United 
States citizen.  During his interview, the examiner noted that Gonzalez-Lora had 
indicated on his application that he had not registered with the Selective Service.  The 
former Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) continued Gonzalez-Lora’s 
naturalization case to permit him to provide evidence of registration.  The INS did not 
receive this evidence, despite twice writing to Gonzalez-Lora to remind him to submit it, 
and the agency ultimately dismissed the application for lack of prosecution.   
 In 1998, Gonzalez-Lora was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and sentenced to 292 months’ imprisonment.  See 
United States v. Lora, 26 F. App’x 149, 150 (4th Cir. 2001) (non-precedential).  In 1999, 
the INS charged Gonzalez-Lora with being removable because he had been convicted of 
a controlled-substance violation, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and an aggravated 
felony, see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  An Immigration Judge found Gonzalez-Lora removable 
as charged, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and we denied his 
petition for review.  See Gonzalez-Lora v. Att’y Gen., 314 F. App’x 447 (3d Cir. 2008).  
In support of his petition for review, Gonzalez-Lora alleged that he was a United States 
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citizen; we rejected his argument, concluding that “submission of an incomplete 
naturalization application . . . and does not render Gonzalez-Lora a national.”  Id. at 450. 
 Gonzalez-Lora has challenged the final order of removal and the denial of his 
naturalization application on several fronts.  At issue here is a petition for review that 
Gonzalez-Lora filed in the District Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) and 1447(b).  
He argued that the INS erred in denying his naturalization application because, contrary 
to the INS’s conclusion, he did provide evidence that he had registered with the Selective 
Service.  He also contended that the INS improperly failed to serve him with a copy of its 
order denying his application.  Based on these alleged failings, he asked the District 
Court to order the INS to grant his naturalization application nunc pro tunc.  The District 
Court (approving and adopting a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation) 
dismissed Gonzalez-Lora’s pleading, concluding that it was barred by principles of 
preclusion and without merit.  Gonzalez-Lora asked the District Court to reconsider the 
order, the District Court denied his request, and Gonzalez-Lora then filed a timely notice 
of appeal to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012).  We exercise a plenary standard of 
review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 
F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) 
motion for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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 Gonzalez-Lora acknowledges that he is not presently entitled to be naturalized; to 
be eligible, the individual must show that he has maintained good moral character until 
being admitted to citizenship, see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 
1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007), and Gonzalez-Lora’s aggravated-felony conviction prevents 
him from making that showing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  Gonzalez-Lora 
argues, therefore, that his naturalization application should be reviewed nunc pro tunc so 
that it may be granted without consideration of his conviction.   
 As the District Court held, Gonzalez-Lora’s argument in foreclosed by our 
decision in Duran-Pichardo v. Attorney General, 695 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2012).  
There, like here, a non-citizen had commenced naturalization proceedings, but then 
committed an aggravated felony before being granted naturalization.  The petitioner in 
Duran-Pichardo argued that he was entitled to nunc pro tunc review of his naturalization 
application as if he were not an aggravated felon.  We denied the request.  We noted that 
8 U.S.C. § 1429 prohibits the naturalization of any person against whom a final order of 
removal has been entered, id. at 277, and observed that we may not grant equitable relief 
in contravention of the expressed intent of Congress, id. at 288.  Consequently, we held 
that “[e]quitable relief is unavailable if it would require agency review of an alien’s 
naturalization application while that alien is the subject of an outstanding finding of 
deportability or a pending removal proceeding.”  Id. at 288.  As noted above, Gonzalez-
Lora is subject to a final order of removal.  Accordingly, for the reasons that we 
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expressed in Duran-Pichardo, Gonzalez-Lora is not entitled to nunc pro tunc review of 
his naturalization application.1 
 In an attempt to overcome this obstacle, Gonzalez-Lora argues that his removal 
order is invalid because it is contrary to our decision in Orabi v. Attorney General, 738 
F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014), in which we reaffirmed that a conviction is not “final” for 
immigration purposes until direct appellate review has been exhausted or waived.  
However, Gonzalez-Lora cannot collaterally attack his removal order in these 
proceedings.  See Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] 
petition for review is ‘the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of 
removal.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)); see also Ajlani v. 
Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 Finally, because Gonzalez-Lora’s Rule 59(e) motion merely “advanced the same 
arguments that were in his” prior filings, the District Court did not err in denying that 
motion.  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Gonzalez-Lora’s 
motion for discovery is denied. 
                                              
1 Because a final order of removal has been entered in Gonzalez-Lora’s case and he seeks 
nunc pro tunc relief, contrary to Gonzalez-Lora’s argument, the rationale of Gonzalez v. 
Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, 678 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), does not 
apply here. 
